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Abstract 
The huge growth in expenditure on counter-extremism and counter-terrorism policy post 
9/11 (Dawson & Guinnessy, 2002; Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006; Silke, 2004) has seen buzz-
words such as ‘resilience’ integrated without clear framing or the underpinning of empirical 
evidence. The issue addressed by the current paper is twofold; the framing of resilience within 
policy is not such that it clearly relates to extremism and, the subsequent lack of understanding 
that exists on the relationships between the three levels of resilience under this framing. The 
National Resilience Scale (Kimhi, Goroshit & Eshel, 2013) is applied alongside measures of 
community and individual resilience to test the hypothesis that all three levels would positively 
correlate with one another. The hypothesis was supported in study one, but not study two with 
community resilience negatively correlating with both individual and national resilience. The 
implications of this conceptual framework are discussed, primarily the impact on contemporary 
policy, specifically around extremism and terrorism. 
Keywords:  Individual Resilience, Community Resilience, National Resilience, 
Extremism, Terrorism, Multiple Regression, Policy  
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Understanding the Three Levels of Resilience: Implications for Countering-Extremism 
Whilst 2001 may seem an age away, there is no doubt that the date of September 11th of 
that year has had a profound impact on governments and law enforcement agencies across the 
world. Not least in the huge growth in expenditure on counter-terrorism strategies (Guinnessy & 
Dawson, 2002; Issues in Science & Technology, 2002; Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006; Silke, 
2004) and the scrutiny to which law enforcement and intelligence agencies are under in relation 
to protecting their homelands (Gill, 2006). During this time, there have been many policy 
developments in relation to countering-extremism and countering terrorism; The integration of 
‘resilience building’ has taken many forms and has, in this endeavour, been aimed at individuals, 
communities and the nation.  However, the conceptualisation of resilience appears blurred and a 
lack of understanding around what exactly is referred to by resilience may be hindering the full 
potential of integrating such a rhetoric within security and social policy. An increased 
understanding around the associations between different levels of resilience may enable priorities 
for preparations and future interventions which are supported by, and developed out of, empirical 
evidence (Kimhi, 2014). The current paper proposes a reframing of the three levels of resilience 
and presents an exploration these, as distinct but related concepts, in the United Kingdom, going 
on to discuss how this knowledge can inform policies and strategies in counter-extremism and 
counter-terrorism. 
Resilience in Policy 
Resilience is a concept with far reaching implications and although dubbed yet another 
‘political buzzword’, it is integrated firmly within multiple public policies (Joseph, 2013) having 
been introduced into the contingency policies of many institutions (Cabinet Office, 2008a; 
2008b; Coaffee, Murakami, Wood & Rogers, 2008; Goldstein, 2012; Martin, 2012; Newman, 
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Beatley & Boyer, 2009). This, of course, has not been without criticism (see, for example, 
MacKinnon & Derickson, 2012). Yet the scope of resilience has grown exponentially. The term 
is now used across disciplines in work concerned with the interactions between people and 
nature (see, for examples, Berkes & Folke, 1998; Holling, Gunderson & Light, 1995; Redman, 
1999; Gunderson, 2001) and as such is seen as a ‘bridging concept’ between the natural and 
social sciences (Davoudi, Shaw, Haider, Quinlan, Peterson & Wilkinson, 2012). With a move 
toward a concept that holds multiple levels of meaning, from the metaphorical to the specific 
(Carpenter, Walker, Anderies & Abel, 2001) the critique of its use is not only understandable, but 
well justified.  
Post- 9/11 the amount of expenditure dedicated to the protection of nations from 
extremism and terrorism increase exponentially (Guinnessy & Dawson, 2002; Issues in Science 
& Technology, 2002; Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006; Silke, 2004). Part of this expenditure has 
been the development of policy and interventions aimed at preventing violent extremism. In the 
US, the introduction of a Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States placed emphasis on the building of community 
resilience in countering violent extremism (The White House Officer of Press Secretary, 2011). 
In the UK, the release of Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy in 
2006 (HM Government, 2006) and the subsequent CONTEST strategy (HM Government, 2014) 
also place emphasis on resilience building. However, resilience as a concept and even more so as 
a political buzzword has not been properly conceptualised in this context. CONTEST in itself has 
not gone without criticism (Thomas, 2010; 2016), not least because the understanding of the 
concepts within are clouded which only adds to the difficulty of evaluating its use. Hence, 
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gaining clarity on what is actually meant by such concepts in this context is likely to contribute 
to the full potential of their implementation.   
Individual resilience 
When resilience is applied to extremism at the individual level there are two main 
directions for strategies; building individual resilience to overcome a terror attack (Fredrickson, 
Tugade, Waugh & Larkin, 2003; Miller, 2013) and building individual resilience to reject an 
extremist rhetoric (Bonnell et al., 2011). The former appears more closely linked to the work in 
this area, being associated with coping in the aftermath of a traumatic experience. The latter, less 
so, and the relationships between resilience and adopting extremist rhetoric’s are unclear at 
present. Yet the increase in popularity of resilience building interventions continues (Bonnell et 
al., 2011). Building resilience at the level of the individual is reflected in the Prevent strand of 
the UK Governments approach to countering extremism, CONTEST (HM Government, 2014).  
 Of the three levels of resilience discussed within this paper, individual resilience has 
received the most attention (Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli & Vlahov, 2007). Fraser, Glainsky and 
Richman (1999) argue that because individuals are malleable, resilience must be distinguished 
from simple survival. Survival does not ensure healthy functioning, and survivors may become 
immobilised by anger or absorbed by victimisation (Wolin & Wolin, 1993). Individual resilience 
has subsequently been defined as the individual’s ability to maintain a stable level of functioning 
following traumatic events and as such a ‘trajectory of healthy functioning across time’ 
(Bonanno, 2005, p.136). As a concept then, some argue individual resilience should only be used 
to refer to ‘unpredicted or markedly successful adaptation to negative life events, trauma, stress, 
and other forms of risk’ (Fraser et al., 1999, p.136). Further, Luthar (2006) argues that resilience 
is never directly measured, but is inferred from evidence of two distinctive dimensions; 
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significant adversity and positive adaptation. However, the later doesn’t at all incorporate the 
‘process by which people can overcome or resist negative influences’ as outlined by Bonnell et 
al., (2001). Of course, the former explicitly incorporates an adaptation to other form of risk, so 
here the risk or threat is the adoption of extremist attitudes and vulnerability to potential 
radicalisation. In terms of positive adaptation this can be understood as an individual’s rejection 
of such and the reduction of vulnerability to radicalisation. This reframing of individual 
resilience is based on the reframing already published by Ellis and Abdi (2017) of community 
resilience. Bonnell et al’s thinking around individual resilience and extremism is coherent, and it 
is clear that such thinking has informed existing critical social policy.  Nevertheless, there is little 
to no research, and certainly no empirical research to the authors knowledge that examines 
individual resilience in this vain. It should be noted, ‘negative influences’ is open to dispute, and 
whilst an important discussion to undertake, is beyond the scope of the current exploratory paper. 
Here, we are framing resilience as a potential for the reduction of vulnerability to extremism.    
Community resilience 
In defining community resilience there is the added issue of defining community. 
Community is a term, which can be seen as such an ingrained concept in everyday life that is 
often used without hesitation or consideration of what it actually means. Norris et al, (2008) 
propose that in defining community resilience they accept that typically ‘a community is an 
entity that has geographic boundaries and shared fate’ (p.128). This is generally the consensus 
within the community resilience literature also, where community refers to neighbourhoods and 
geographically defined areas (Aldrich, 2012). However, the continued modernisation of society 
means that not all situations, where an understanding of community resilience may be useful, are 
guaranteed to impact a community defined by geographical boundaries. This is certainly true in 
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the context of a cyber-terror attack (Parks & Duggan, 2011), where instead, the ‘community’ may 
be users of a certain information system (Jormakka & Molsa, 2005). When considering resilience 
building as a counter-measure for extremism, the same problem arises, a community may be the 
online community in which an individual is most susceptible to radicalisation.  A broader 
definition of community may be appropriate in light of the lack of scope to really explore the 
meaning of community here. Lee and Newby (1983) devised three definitions; community as a 
‘geographical expression’, as a ‘local social system’ and, finally ‘identity and commonality’ as a 
group of individuals. This trio of definitions integrates the idea that not all communities are 
spatially defined by geographical location, and instead may be defined by the values they hold or 
collective action they possess. Moreover, social psychologists have emphasised the importance 
of psychological sense of community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Sarson, 1974). Psychological 
sense of community builds on the idea of group cohesiveness and seeks to identify the factors at 
play when an individual is part of a ‘community’ and feels part of that ‘community’.  McMillan 
and Chavis (1986) propose four elements that underpin this sense of community; membership, 
influence, integration and fulfilment of needs, and shared emotional connection. Psychological 
sense of community is discussed as relating to both subgroups such as religion or for example, 
animal rights activists, which are formed or exist on the basis of shared characteristics, and also 
to larger encompassing groups for which many subgroups may belong to such as nationality.  
The concept of psychological sense of community has been used to inform many community-
based interventions, especially in relation to crime (for example, see Aiyer, Zimmerman, Morrel-
Samuels & Reischi, 2014), highlighting the view of communities as being critical to violence 
prevention across a spectrum of violence types (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). Community-based 
interventions also draw upon the importance of developing strong bonds in preventing violence. 
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Social control theory, introduced by Hirschi (1969), proposes the presence of strong familial, 
community and societal bonds are fundamental in violence prevention. Such bonds not only 
convey the social norms and expectations but also act as a motivator for abiding by those norms. 
Of course, extremism itself and the attitudes underpinning such is partly defined upon the basis 
of a violation of social norms (Kruglanski, Gelfand, belanger, Shevaland, Hetiarachi & 
Gunaratna, 2014). It is likely that the conveyance of social norms and expectations are 
particularly important in the countering of extremism.  
Even in an attempt to overcome the issue of defining community there are still various 
definitions of community resilience (see, for review, Noris et al, 2008). In these definitions, there 
are two important features that underpin the consensus. Firstly, that resilience is better 
conceptualised as an ability or process than an outcome (Pfefferbaum, Reissman, Pfefferbaum, 
Klomp & Gurtwitch, 2005). Secondly, that resilience is better conceptualised as an adaptability 
than as stability (Waller, 2001). Subsequently, Norris et al., (2008) offer the following definition 
of community resilience: ‘a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of 
functioning and adaptation after a disturbance’ (p.131). The understanding of community 
resilience as a way of preparing for disaster, be it man made or otherwise, has been broadly 
embraced within research and policy circles (Pfefferbaum, Pfefferbaum & Van Horn, 2015). 
However, only recently have researchers begun to shift the focus to community resilience as a 
means of countering-extremism. Ellis and Abdi (2017) discuss in detail community resilience 
building as an intervention for violent extremism. Ellis and Abdi (2017) suggest ‘the challenge or 
threat can be understood as the potential for violent extremists to recruit individuals to their 
cause and potentially even engage in violence; successful adaptation to this threat would be a 
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community that comes together in such a way that its members are no longer vulnerable to the 
threat’ (p. 291).   
National resilience 
A new avenue of investigation that has gained the interest of psychological researchers is 
resilience in the context of a wider societal phenomenon (Barnett, 2004; Chemtob, 2005). The 
concept of national resilience, which has sometimes been collapsed alongside community 
resilience as social resilience (Cacioppo, Reis & Zautra, 2011), is broad and seemingly addresses 
the issue of society’s sustainability and strength in several diverse realms (Obrist, Pfeiffer & 
Henley, 2010). The concept emerged through an acknowledgement that it is not only military 
capacity that defines a nation’s power, but also political-psychological aspects (Barnett, 2004; 
Canetti, Waismel-Manor, Cohen & Rapaport, 2014; Kimhi & Eshel, 2009). It is however, the 
least understood (Canetti et al., 2014) especially from an applied perspective (Obrist et al., 
2010). Four main social components have been attributed to national resilience (Ben-Dor, 
Pedahzur, Canetti-Nisim & Zaidise, 2002); patriotism, optimism, social integration, and trust in 
political and public institutions. Together, it is proposed these related factors underpin national 
resilience and allow for it to be measured using a psychological questionnaire that includes items 
pertaining to each factor (Kimhi & Eshel, 2009) in the same way measures exist for both 
individual resilience (Connor & Davidson, 2003) and community resilience (Leykin et al., 2013). 
It should be noted, the factorial structure of national resilience is not consistent throughout the 
literature, with other studies showing the presence of five factors, (Kimhi & Eshel, 2009), albeit 
similar to the four components previously proposed; trust in the prime minister and the 
government, patriotism, coping with a national crisis, social justice and trust in national 
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institutions. Parmak (2015) further highlights the need to develop a greater conceptual 
understanding of national resilience and measures through which it can be explored. 
Research has also shown that a number of variables may predict community and national 
resilience. Kimhi, Goroshit & Eshel (2013) explored the extent to which four antecedent 
variables were able to predict sources of resilience, finding that community type, age, levels of 
religiosity and preparedness all significantly predicted community and national resilience. 
However, this investigation was carried out among a specific sample in Israel comprising of 
Kibbutz members, Moshav members, village inhabitant and town dwellers. It is therefore not yet 
determinable whether community and national resilience would operate the same way in other 
cultures. As with community resilience, the majority of the exploration has been from the 
perspective of resilience building to cope with severe adversity. There is no previous literature to 
the authors knowledge that frames all three levels of resilience as concepts that may have 
important implications for the rejection of extremist attitudes. As has been done with individual 
resilience here, and community resilience (Ellis & Abdi, 2017) so then, may National Resilience, 
be reframed to view the threat or challenge as the wider network in which an individual may be 
exposed to or recruited in to extremism. Successful adaptation equates to the nation coming 
together, formed by each community and individual, to reduce vulnerability of its members to 
the threat. In reality it is likely that such a relationship is far more complex, and although all 
three levels may correlate one another there are likely many further factors to explore. The result 
of immigration is that, especially within the UK, the presence of a multinational society has 
emerged, which is also reflected in the increased use of rhetoric within public discourse around 
multiculturalism (Parmak, 2015). The impact of this not only on national resilience, but also on 
community resilience is particularly important to understand when making recommendations for 
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public policy. Parmak (2015) discusses that within multinational societies, the cohesiveness of 
‘in groups and out groups’, and the categorisation of ‘us and them’ may diminish the overall 
resilience at the national level.  
Associations Between the Three Levels  
It would seem logical to consider that as communities and societies are made up of 
individuals, that the individual themselves would play a significant role in resilience at the level 
of the community. Likewise, nations are made up of communities and so it would also seem 
logical to consider that communities would play a significant role in resilience at the level of the 
nation. However, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that alone, individual resilience 
predicts community resilience and in turn national resilience. As Patterson, Well and Patel (2010) 
discuss most decision processes are informed by a complex array of interactions between 
individuals, the communities they are in and the environment in which they are in.  
Only recently has research begun to examine the associations between all three levels of 
resilience (Kimhi et al., 2013; Kimhi, 2014). Kimhi (2014) found that individual, community and 
national resilience were all positively correlated with each other, but that their low common 
variance also emphasised their distinctiveness.  
The Current Study 
The place for resilience within UK policy is not questioned here, instead the key problem 
presented is twofold; in order to target extremism, the framing of threat and adaptation needs to 
be refocused, and a lack of understanding around how the three levels of resilience as separate 
concepts are associated (Kimhi, 2014).  This paper has made an attempt to reframe both 
individual resilience and national resilience based on the reframing of community resilience by 
Ellis and Abdi (2017). By defining the threat as extremism and successful adaptation as 
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vulnerability reduction, the current paper aims to explore all three levels and discuss the 
implications to future intervention and policy in the area of counter-extremism.  In doing so, data 
is also analysed to assess the validity and reliability of measures of resilience. Based on the 
literature discussed and previous explorations of the associations it is hypothesised that all three 
levels of resilience will be positively correlated with one another. As this paper is the first 
exploration of the three levels of resilience in the UK, two studies are presented, an initial 
piloting of the three resilience scales on a student population and a second study on a larger 
sample of the general population. Accordingly, the current analysis is a preliminary exploration 
of the data obtained.  
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Methodology  
Design 
The aim of the research is to understand how the three levels of resilience relate to each 
other in the United Kingdom under the framing of threat as extremism. The aim was deliberately 
broad to enable an initial exploration of these concepts and to determine the reliability of the 
National Resilience Scale (Kimhi et al., 2013) that had not previously been conducted on a UK 
sample. Based on the previous literature it was hypothesised that all three levels of resilience will 
be positively correlated with one another. The studies adopted a cross-sectional design in order to 
support this examination of the three levels of resilience. Study one involved a pilot of the scales 
being used on a sample of undergraduate student. Data was collected using paper-based survey 
administration. Study two involved the scales being used on a sample of the general population. 
Data was collected using both web-based distribution and paper-based administration to facilitate 
a larger response to be reached whilst minimizing costs (Greenlaw & Brown-Welty, 2009).  
Sample – Study One  
A sample of 134 undergraduate students was utilised for the initial piloting of the scale. 
The majority of participants were born in the United Kingdom (84%). The age of participants 
ranged from 18 to 55. The gender distribution was 85% female respondents and 15% male 
respondents. Across the sample 9.7% reported belonging to a very small community, 24.6% to a 
small community, 28.4% to a small/medium community, 22.4% to a medium/large community, 
7.5% to a large community and 6.7% to a very large community; 56.7% of respondents said they 
were secular in relation to religiosity, 16.4% traditional, 23.9% religious and .7% very religious; 
50.7% stated they followed no religion, 23.9% Christianity, 18.7% Islam, and 4.5% other.   
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Sample – Study Two  
A mixed methods approach to sampling was used to obtain responses from 355 
individuals. The majority of participants were born in the United Kingdom (83.7%). The age of 
participants ranged from 18 to 74. The gender distribution was 65.4% female respondents and 
34.6% male respondents. Across the sample 36.3% reported belonging to a very small 
community, 8.7% to a small community, 6.8% to a small/ medium community, 9.3% to a 
medium/ large community, 3.9% to a large community and 34.9% to a very large community; 
62% of respondents said they were secular in relation to religiosity, 20.3% traditional, 10.1% 
religious, and 7.6% very religious; 54.4% stated they followed no religion, 26.8% Christianity, 
3.1% Islam, and 15.7% other.  
Measures 
Three scale constructs were used to assess the associations between the three levels of 
resilience alongside demographics. Both the Conjoint Community Resilience Assessment 
Measure, CCRAM (Leykin et al., 2013) and the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC, 
Connor & Davidson, 2003), short version (Green et al., 2014) have previously been tested for 
reliability among UK samples.  
National Resilience 
 The current scale was devised based on the earlier version by Kimhi, Goroshit and Eshel 
(2013). The scales consisted of 25 items pertaining to trust in the prime minister and the 
government, patriotism, coping with national crises, social justice and trust in national 
institutions. The 6-point response scale ranges from 1= very strongly disagree to 6=very strongly 
agree. The scale’s reliability was found to be highly reliable in both studies (25 items; α=.89 & α 
= .92 retrospectively).   
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Community resilience 
 Community resilience was measured by a short version of the community resilience 
scale developed by the Conjoint Community Resilience Assessment Measure (CCRAM) (Leykin 
et al., 2013). This scale consists of 10 items pertaining to identification with one’s community, 
trust in municipal authorities and confidence in the community’s ability to withstand adversities. 
The 5-point scale ranges from 1 = does not agree at all to 5 = totally agree. The scale’s reliability 
was found to be highly reliable in both studies (10 items; both α=.88).   
Individual resilience 
 Individual resilience was measured by the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-
RISC, Connor & Davidson, 2003), short version (Green et al., 2014). The scale consists of 14 
statements which require the respondent to indicate on a scale of 1-7 the extent to which they 
agree or disagree with each in relation to how they have felt in the last month. The scale’s 
reliability was found to be highly reliable in both studies (14 items; α=.88 & α = .91 
retrospectively).   
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Results 
Study One 
Reliability Analysis 
Internal Consistency 
 To measure internal consistency Cronbachs α was used, coefficients above 0.70 are 
agreed to reflect good internal consistency (Clark & Watson, 1995). Cronbachs α for all scales 
are presented in Table 1.  The main scale for which it was important to check internal 
consistency, was the National Resilience Scale, as this is the first sample for which it has been 
used in the United Kingdom. The National Resilience Scale was found to have high internal 
consistency; α = .90.   
 Associations among the three levels of resilience 
Correlations 
 The relationships between the three levels of resilience were investigated using 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient, see Table 1. All three relationships were found 
to be significant. A strong positive correlation between national resilience and community 
resilience was found, r = .58, n = 134, p < .01, with high levels of national resilience associated 
with higher levels of community resilience. A weak positive correlation was found between 
community resilience and individual resilience, r = .20, n = 134, p < .05, with high levels of 
community resilience associated with high levels of individual resilience. A weak positive 
correlation was found between national resilience and individual resilience, r = .30, n = 134, p 
< .01, with high levels of national resilience associated with high levels of individual resilience. 
Showing that the associations between community resilience and national resilience are stronger 
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than the associations between national and individual resilience, and between community and 
individual resilience.   
Multiple Regression 
 A multiple regression was performed to investigate how well individual resilience and 
community resilience predict national resilience, see Table 2.   
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Since a no a priori hypotheses had been made to 
determine the order of entry of the predictor variables, a direct method was used for the multiple 
linear regression analysis. The two independent variables explained 37% of variance in national 
resilience (F (2, 131) = 38.44, p <. 001). In the final model both predictor variables were 
statistically significant, with community resilience recording a higher Beta value (β = .54, p 
<.001) than individual resilience (β = .19, p <.01).  
Study Two  
Reliability Analysis 
Internal Consistency  
To measure internal consistency Cronbachs α was used, coefficients above 0.70 are 
agreed to reflect good internal consistency (Clark & Watson, 1995). Cronbachs α for all scales 
are presented in Table 1.  The main scale for which it was important to check internal 
consistency, was the National Resilience Scale, as this is the first sample for which it has been 
used in the United Kingdom. The National Resilience Scale was found to have high internal 
consistency; α = .92.  
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Table 1. 
Alpha Cronbach and Pearson correlations among research variables for both study one and 
study two.  
Variable   α Community 
resilience 
Individual 
resilience 
Study one 
 
 
National resilience .89 .58** .30** 
Community resilience .88  .20* 
Individual resilience .88   
 
 
Study two 
 
 
National resilience .92 -.244** .173** 
Community resilience .87  -.341** 
Individual resilience .91   
*p<.05, **p<.001 
 
Associations among the three levels of resilience 
Correlations 
The relationships between the three levels of resilience were investigated using Pearson’s 
product-moment correlation coefficient, see Table 1. All three relationships were found to be 
significant. Individual resilience showed a weak positive correlation with national resilience, r 
=.173, n = 355, p <.001. Community resilience showed a weak negative correlation with national 
resilience, r = -.244, n = 355, p <.001. Community resilience showed a medium negative 
correlation with individual resilience, r = -.341, n = 355, p <.001. Showing that an increase in 
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community resilience is associated with a decrease in individual resilience and national 
resilience. Increases in individual resilience however is associated with an increase in national 
resilience.  
Multiple Regression  
A multiple regression was performed to investigate how well individual resilience and 
community resilience predict national resilience, see Table 2.  
 
Table 2. 
 Multiple Regression for study one and study two   
 R2 β B SE CI 95% 
(B) 
Study one  
 
Model .37***     
Community Resilience  .54*** 1.52 .20 1.13/1.91 
Individual Resilience   .19** .51 .19 .14/.89 
 
Study two  
 
Model  .06**     
Community Resilience  -.19** -.52 .15 -.83/-.22 
Individual Resilience   .11* .25 .12 .01/.49 
*P<.05 **P<.01, ***P<.001  
 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Since a no a priori hypotheses had been made to 
determine the order of entry of the predictor variables, a direct method was used for the multiple 
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linear regression analysis. The two independent variables explained 6.1% of the variance in 
national resilience F (2, 352) = 11.37, p <.001. In the final model both predictors were 
statistically significant, with community resilience recording a higher Beta value (β = -.19, p 
<.001) than individual resilience (β = .11, p <.01).  
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Discussion 
Previous findings show three distinct but related levels of resilience; individual, 
community and national (Kimhi, 2014). Whilst some research has collapsed the latter two and 
investigated these under societal resilience, literature in this area suggests that there is enough 
distinction between these two to warrant developing an understanding of them as separate 
concepts (Ben-Dor et al., 2002; Kimhi, 2014). The current study aimed to investigate the three 
levels among the UK population as an initial conceptual exploration after the reframing of these 
to the issue of extremism, to give future direction to research in this area with specific focus on 
the implications such an understanding holds for policy makers, especially in an age where 
national security and, extremism and terrorism specifically has such importance.  
Exploring the Three Levels of Resilience  
The current exploration of national, community and individual resilience among a UK 
sample firstly found the three scales of resilience to be highly reliable in both samples. In 
relation to the second aim, the current study examined the associations between the three levels 
of resilience.  
Based on the significant correlations found between the three levels in both samples we 
may assume, whilst related, these represent independent structures, supporting previous research 
(Kimhi, 2014). However, the relationships between the three levels of resilience operated 
differently in study one and study two. Within study one the hypothesis of each level of 
resilience being positively correlated with the others was supported. Among undergraduate 
students, community resilience and national resilience were most strongly related, again showing 
similar results to those previously found (Kimhi, 2014). However, in study two the hypothesis 
was not supported. This further exploration of the three levels of resilience, conducted among the 
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general population, found community resilience was to be negatively correlated with both 
individual and national resilience, whilst national resilience maintained a positive correlation 
with individual resilience. This indicates there are important differences in the role communities 
play in national resilience dependent on the sample being examined.  
One explanation for this may lie in the understanding of psychological sense of 
community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). This finding may suggest that the underpinning 
elements of a psychological sense of community are distinct to sub-groups as discussed in the 
review of the literature, and that it may be these that indicate why communities may be so 
valuable in violence prevention (Aiyer et al., 2014), as opposed to wider interventions at the 
level of the nation. However, this does not explain why the relationship differed among the 
student sample and the general population. So then, may resilience be best viewed as constructs 
that relate differently to one another dependent on context rather than levels that build upon one 
another.  
Another explanation for this difference in findings is the impact of immigration on the 
UK and as such the emergence of a multinational society (Parmak, 2015). It may be that within a 
small sample of university students the impact of the multinational society, group cohesiveness 
and associated group categorisations was lessened. However, when a larger sample of the general 
population was examined, we may have seen the effect detailed by Parmak (2015) in that these 
factors may diminish the overall resilience at the national level. Likewise, when comparing these 
findings to those found by Kimhi (2014), where Israel is not an emerging multinational society. 
What was particularly interesting here however, was that individual resilience remained 
positively correlated with national resilience yet not with community resilience. This indicates 
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that it is something within the resilience of the community that may diminish when considering 
oneself as an individual or part of the nation.  
Predicting Resilience  
In order to fully explore the three levels a multiple regression was carried out using 
individual and community resilience as predictive factors on the basis the correlations would 
indicate that if resilience at one level changes then resilience at the next level will change. This 
analysis revealed that when both individual resilience and community resilience were regressed 
on to national resilience, community resilience was the better predictor in both study one and 
study two. Despite significance, the strength to which individual resilience predicts national 
resilience was found to be low, suggesting that there are important factors beyond the individual, 
and beyond the community that should be considered in the development of resilience building 
strategies within UK policy. The differences between the findings among a student sample and a 
general population sample were particularly important here and highlight the differences that 
may occur when examining societal issues among specific populations (Druckman & Kam, 
2009) and offering direction for future explorations to determine why such differences in this 
context occur. The findings here do however, within both samples, emphasise the importance of 
specificity in any resilience building rhetoric around the level at which it is intended to operate 
and the level/s at which it aims to have impact. The findings suggest that building resilient 
individuals alone, or even building resilient communities does not complete the picture in 
building national resilience, highlighting the complexity of interactions between individuals, 
communities and their environment (Patterson et al., 2010). However, the findings do indicate 
that there are relationships between the three that with further understanding may be drawn upon, 
together, to develop future interventions targeting all three levels and operating in cohesion. 
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From this, it would be an appropriate direction to begin to explore which further factors are 
predictors of not only national resilience, but resilience at all three levels to inform future 
resilience building strategies. Further, in the general population, for which social policies apply, 
community resilience may in fact have negative consequences on national resilience, for here 
although community resilience remained the better predictor, the direction was negative in a 
general population sample. This may to some extent, be a reflection of the differences between 
individuals and groups in how they define community (Charles & Davies, 2005). It is important 
that policies work together, by seeing the bigger picture, policy makers may be better equipped 
to develop interventions that work coherently in achieving overall goals. Research has previously 
shown how current policy is failing to do this in the area of communities and extremism 
(Thomas, 2010) yet there doesn’t appear to be a strategy to address such.    
The Conceptual Framework   
Together, the findings indicate a framework by which all three levels of resilience relate 
to each other, and that at each level the predictive ability of one predicting the next is stronger. 
Although the direction of prediction may differ among samples. This goes beyond previous 
research that discussed the associations in terms of how they correlate to one another (Kimhi, 
2014) and begins to explore the relationships at a greater depth. The findings also indicate that 
there is value in further exploration of predictors of resilience at each level to inform and develop 
such a framework, especially in consideration of the reframing of resilience to extremism. That 
is, the threat as extremism or extremist attitudes and adaptation as individuals, communities and 
the nation coming together in such a way that they and their members are no longer vulnerable to 
the threat (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). Resilience at one level alone is not enough to predict resilience at 
the others, as shown in previous research that found specific demographics can predict resilience 
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at the level of the nation (Kimhi et al., 2013). Variables such as community size, religiosity, sex 
and age are likely to play a significant role in the prediction of resilience (Kimhi et al., 2013). 
Further, it is likely that certain events, such as a terror attack, impact resilience at all three levels 
in different ways, both in the short term and the long term. Such events, at least in the short term, 
have a significant impact on the way outgroups are categorised (Skitka, Bauman & Mullen, 
2004) and as previously highlighted by Parmak (2015) polarization of attitudes can escalate in a 
very short timeframe after such events occur. Therefore, not only should attention be given to 
how the three levels of resilience operate within multinational societies at times of ‘normality’ as 
done here but also as to how events such as terror attacks influence this both in the immediate 
post event period, but also longitudinally (Coaffee, 2013).  
Practical Implications 
With regard to determining what works in relation to social policy and specific strategies, 
a greater understanding of the concepts on which they are based also allows for greater 
transparency and increased direction for conducting evaluations. This is not being ignorant to the 
need for, at times, developing and publishing certain policies and strategies despite the lack of an 
evidence base. Such times when the public look for something to be done, quickly. But, where 
possible this should encourage the uptake of primary empirical research and those creating such 
policies should be open to continuous development of such strategies on the back of such 
evidence bases. There should be a greater focus on moving away from myopic policies and 
towards long-term strategies that are based on evidence, clear for practitioners to apply and 
subject to evaluation to determine validity upon different populations. The findings that the three 
levels of resilience are independent structures, which supports the previous literature (Kimhi, 
2014) also has important implications. The understanding of each of the three constructs of 
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resilience alongside how they are associated, and interact with each other has the potential to 
inform more specific strategies of ‘resilience building’ that are able to draw on evidence around 
which level of resilience may be most effective to target for the intended outcome. Whilst 
research shows there is some evidence of building resilience at different levels in countering-
extremism and terrorism (Bonnell et al., 2011; Coaffee & Rogers, 2008; Coaffee & Wood, 2006; 
Fredrickson et al., 2003; Haimes et al., 2008; Hardy, 2015 Miller, 2013) the current paper gives 
direction for further investigation as to how the three levels of resilience can be best used to both 
inform and evaluate interventions in this area. This is not limited only to current directions in 
building individual resilience to reject extremist rhetoric’s (Bonnell et al., 2011), but also, it is 
our contention that especially when related to a wider understanding of resilience it may also be 
applied to various stages within pathways to violent action such as attempts to recruit 
individuals. The power that an in-depth understanding of resilience may hold when applied to 
policies aimed to counter certain rhetoric’s and behaviours should not be underestimated. The 
reframing of resilience to refer explicitly to the threat of adopting an extremist rhetoric also 
allows for more direct implications to be discussed and a clearer understanding of what is being 
modelled.   
Limitations and Future Directions  
The difference in direction of relationships found in study one and study two warrants 
further exploration in order to determine why community resilience in one situation positively 
correlates with national resilience and in another negatively correlates. It is an interesting finding 
that shows the importance of recognizing the potential implications of using narrow samples in 
researching societal issues. A greater focus on the meaning of community and the role of the 
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community to an individual offers an avenue of exploration to further develop the understanding 
of resilience here and these differences.  
It was highlighted in the introduction that the factorial structure underpinning national 
resilience has been different across studies (Ben-Dor et al., 2002; Kimhi & Eshel, 2009). A full 
exploration of the National Resilience Scale (Kimhi et al., 2013) was beyond the scope of the 
current paper that aimed to assess initial reliability and associations, however a full exploration 
of the scale will allow for a greater understanding of national resilience and the factors 
underpinning such when applied to a UK sample.  
Conclusion 
The current study reframed both individual resilience and national resilience, as had 
previously been done for community resilience (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). The current study applied 
the National Resilience Scale (Kimhi et al., 2013) to a UK sample alongside measures of 
community and individual resilience to determine whether it could be a suitable measure for 
National Resilience outside of Israel where the majority of testing has taken place. Ultimately, 
findings suggest that the scale is reliable when used on a UK sample. Further, the findings 
showed three distinct concepts which was consistent with previous research (Kimhi, 2014), 
although the relationship between national and community resilience appears to be stronger 
among a UK sample and the direction of the relationship varies dependent on population. As a 
concept applied to policy, resilience has the potential to have wide-ranging implications. The 
findings of the current study indicate that it should not be haphazardly applied to social policy, 
especially in relation to counter-extremism where it appears to refer to both the individual and 
the wider society, without trying to develop the understanding around the three levels of 
resilience as independent concepts.  
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Ultimately, any strategy or intervention, where resilience is a factor, should not fail to 
distinguish between the three constructs. Further, it encourages an increased interest in 
examining resilience within the UK with consideration of the three levels and how such an 
understanding can inform policy aimed to counter-extremism. Whilst the focus here has been 
narrow, the practical implications of such an understanding have a much wider reach both within 
policy circles and beyond.   
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